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FURTHER EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS AND
FINDINGS ON THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
Robert Steinbuch *
While empirical research is often eschewed in legal analysis, it can
provide afirm basis on which to predictjudicial decisions. As a follow-
up to An Empirical Analysis of Reversal Rates in the Eighth Circuit
During 2008, this Article provides further insights into the correlation
between a district judge's political affiliation and the rate at which the
judge is reversed. Correlation, whether with or without a causal
connection, is a critical predictor of a case's success on appeal.
Further objective research is encouraged beyond the Eight Circuit.
Such research should concentrate not on dissenting rates, but on
isolating the factors that statistically impact reversal rates, as
attorneys, clients, and the justice system will all benefit from more
predictable outcomes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The well-respected academic and jurist Richard Posner once
wrote: "A dearth of quantitative scholarship has been a serious
shortcoming of legal research .... When hypotheses cannot be
tested by means of experiments .. . and the results assessed
rigorously by reference to the conventions of statistical inference,
speculation is rampant and knowledge meager."' His son, and also
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law. John M. Olin
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University of Pennsylvania. Former clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Former attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, the Internal Revenue Service at the U.S.
Department of Treasury, and the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. The author wishes to
thank Professors Frances Fendler, Christian Turner, Bobby Bartlett, and Pearl Steinbuch for their
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wishes to thank the outstanding staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, in particular
Elleny Christopoulos, Lillian Chu, Elena DeCoste Grieco, and Emily Shaaya. This Article is
dedicated to mentor, friend, and thinker, Michael Shaheen Jr.
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 411 (2001); see also ROBERT
LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 4 (2009) ("There is some empirical evidence (as
seems fitting to cite) that the use of empirical techniques for investigating law is the most
discernible recent trend in legal scholarship. Law schools are now full of scholars who are less
persuaded by argumentation and more persuaded by empirical evidence. We think the next
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well-noted academic, Eric Posner,2 furthered: "It is never easy to
evaluate judges, or to evaluate their [anecdotal] evaluators, especially
when those evaluators insist on anonymity. Fortunately, data on
judicial performance exist, and although the data have problems as
well, they provide a firmer basis for evaluation."3
Others seem less inclined to use empirical research in legal
analysis:
I eschew empirical descriptions of how female judges are
doing their jobs, taking a more anecdotal approach. ...
While it has become fashionable in legal academic circles
for scholars to rely on or even conduct empirical research,
there is much to be gained by other forms of knowledge.
Cases tell stories.4
And while I certainly agree that cases tell stories, and that much can
be gained from studying the individual facts of cases, empirical
research has emerged as a critical tool for the advancement of legal
research.' It should not be shunned. Rather, it should be understood
and embraced as the rigorous and objective method of evaluation that
it is.
Armed with this philosophy, I recently conducted an empirical
research study and published an article that evaluates factors
affecting outcomes in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit titled An Empirical Analysis of Reversal Rates in the Eighth
Circuit During 2008 ("Reversal Rates").'
In this Article, I present new conclusions (not included in
Reversal Rates) derived from the original data and expand upon the
discussion in Reversal Rates. In addition, since empirical analysis
remains in legal academia a relatively unexplored area of legal
generation of judges, lawyers, legislators, and other policy makers trained by these legal scholars
will be similarly more persuaded by empirical results." (footnote omitted)).
2. See Eric Posner, UNIV. OF CHI. LAW SCH., http://www.law.uchicago.edulfaculty/
posner-e (last visited Aug. 28, 2010); see also ERIC POSNER, http://www.ericposner.com (last
visited Sept. 1, 2010).
3. Eric Posner, Judge Sonia Sotomayor: What the Data Show, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(May 13, 2009, 11:40 AM), http://volokh.com/posts/1242229209.shtmi; cf Nicholas Wade, A
Decade Later, Gene Map Yields Few New Cures, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2010, at Al ("One can
prefer to be an optimist or a pessimist, but the best approach is to be an empiricist.").
4. Theresa M. Beiner, Female Judging, 36 U. TOL. L. REv. 821, 821-22 (2005).
5. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note I and accompanying text.
6. Robert Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis of Reversal Rates in the Eighth Circuit During
2008,43 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 51 (2009).
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research,' I hope to provide some of the insights that I gathered in
conducting my study and writing Reversal Rates.
II. MODELING, CONCLUSIONS, AND FURTHER CONCLUSIONS
A. Factors Affecting Reversal
In Reversal Rates, I modeled the likelihood of reversal as a
function of various factors that the literature discusses as possibly
affecting judicial decision making.' Based on its preeminence in the
literature in the field, I first considered the party of the judge:
Democrat or Republican. Similarly, I also considered:9 whether the
judge's status was active or not, the number of appeals taken from
the judge's decisions that year, the type of case appealed, 1 and the
interactions of any of the above factors. "
7. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 1 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 143-44 (2005); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION
157-60 (1997); RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 174 (2008); Stephen J. Choi & G.
Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. LEGAL
STUD. 87 (2008); Harry Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of Principled
Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837, 837-38 (1991); Richard A. Epstein, The Independence
of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 BYU L. REV. 827, 827-28
(1990); F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the
State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 433-34 (2004); Joanna M. Shepard, The Influence of
Retention Politics on Judges' Voting, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169, 171 (2009); Nancy C. Staudt,
Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 612, 614 (2004). See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL.,
ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006)
(discussing whether politics affect judicial decision making).
9. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 1, at 172 (discussing coding data into variables).
10. I disaggregated this data into four separate categories: civil, criminal, habeas corpus, and
other.
11. For example, my study analyzed the interaction of political party and the number of
appeals taken from each judge to see whether any disparity in reversal rate that correlated to
political affiliation of the trial judge could also be related to the fact that more appeals were taken
from judges of one party. The data presented no such interaction. I did not include other factors in
the regression analysis, such as who won at the trial level, if the variable was highly collinear
with my included factors, such as party affiliation. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1553, 1585 (2008).
The use of this variable would result in multicollinearity, thereby undermining the study's results.
The best regression models are those in which the independent variables each correlate highly
with the dependent variable but correlate only minimally with each other. Such a model is often
called "low noise" and will be statistically robust; i.e., it will predict reliably across numerous
samples of variable sets drawn from the same statistical population. Statisticians and empiricists
strive to eliminate multicollinearity in their studies. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 1, at 326
(discussing the risks of multicollinearity and the need to avoid it: "The most obvious method of
avoiding the problems associated with multicollinearity is to think carefully about the
independent variables that you will include and not to include those that are likely to be
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For the first factor-political party-I categorized the judge
based on the party of the appointing President. This well-accepted
approach is known in various circles as the attitudinal model of
judicial decision making. " Using this method of political-party
assignment reasonably avoids the virtually impossible task of
implementing an unbounded continuous variable for political party
based on subjective evaluations of each jurist or of assigning
different political affiliations to judges appointed by different
presidents of the same party-particularly with a sample set of
judges dating back to a Kennedy appointee.
In Reversal Rates, I examined over one thousand district court
decisions that the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed
in 2008. " The conclusion of the study on this issue was remarkable.
The study showed a distinct correlation between a district court
judge's political affiliation and the rate at which the Eighth Circuit
reversed the judge on appeal. 14 Using a logistic regression analysis, "
the study revealed that district court judges affiliated with the
Democratic Party were reversed on appeal by the Eighth Circuit-
which currently has fourteen Republican and three Democratic
judges-approximately one and a half times more often than district
court judges affiliated with the Republican Party. 6
As it turned out, this was the only factor that correlated to
reversal. Since the investigation was designed to determine the
characteristics of the trial judge that correlate with reversal by the
collinear") (emphasis added)); cf id at 236 (regarding the relevance of reporting determinations
of no statistically significant correlation of examined factors).
12. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATITUDINAL MODEL 64 (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological
Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 302-03,
(2004) ("Many people believe that political ideology should not and generally does not affect
legal judgments, and this belief contains some truth.. .. It might be predicted that even when the
law is unclear, ideology does not matter; the legal culture imposes a discipline on judges, so that
judges vote as judges, rather than as ideologues. Or it might be predicted that in hard cases, the
judges' 'attitudes' end up predicting their votes, so that liberal judges show systematically
different votes . . . from those of conservative judges.. . . It is extremely difficult to investigate
these questions directly. It is possible, however, to identify a proxy for political ideology: the
political affiliation of the appointing president. Presidents are frequently interested in ensuring
that judicial appointees are of a certain stripe.").
13. See Steinbuch, supra note 6, at 55.
14. Id. at 61.
15. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 1, at 345-47 (discussing logistic regression).
16. See Steinbuch, supra note 6, at 61.
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Eighth Circuit, someone armed with information from my study
could analyze the statistical likelihood of success of an appeal based
on non-case-specific criteria.
While Reversal Rates discussed possible reasons for the
correlation, e.g., causation, " this is an area that empiricists are
rightly cautious to broach. Statisticians find causation far more
challenging than correlation. The beauty of the findings of Reversal
Rates, however, is that correlation itself is rich with useful
information. Correlation informs the user regardless of the cause.
Take, as examples, two illustrations:
First, imagine that an eccentric hermit claims that he can make it
rain. And every time he emerges from his solitude and engages in his
efforts to create rain, it, in fact, rains a day later. Most would believe
that the individual was not controlling rain. However, if he was able
to repeat his actions well beyond the likelihood of mere chance (as
shown through statistics), then the correlation, nonetheless, would be
useful. We could use the eccentric's claims of creating rain as a
method to predict rain (for travel, crops, etc.) to our benefit. In other
words, the correlation itself is useful, notwithstanding that we
actually reject the claimed causation and may not (as of yet) have an
alternative explanation.
Second, research has demonstrated that the use of mouthwash
containing alcohol correlates with mouth cancer. 19 A simple mistake
would be to conclude that the mouthwash causes cancer. The
conclusion may be true, but it may also be false. An alternative
explanation may be that people with developing mouth cancer may
have bad breath. As a consequence, these people may be more likely
to use mouthwash to address their illness. Thus, under the first
17. Id. at 65 ("This study supports the conclusion that judicial decision making is more than
a mechanical exercise; it is instead a product of many factors including a judge's political and
world views. This study suggests that when the political and world views of the appellate court
judges align with those of a district court judge in a subordinate court, the district court judge's
decisions are less likely to be reversed by the appellate court. It should be noted that there is no
evidence in this study to suggest that politics was a direct and nefarious cause of the higher
reversal rate of Democratic judges. In other words, this study does not suggest that the judges on
the Eighth Circuit directly considered the political party affiliation of any given district court
judge in deciding whether to reverse a case. This study does demonstrate, however, that there is a
latent but discernible correlation between a district court judge's political party affiliation and the
propensity of the Eighth Circuit to reverse the judge's decisions." (footnote omitted)).
18. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 1, at 290, 311-12 (discussing causality and causation).
19. A. Weaver et al., Mouthwash and Oral Cancer: Carcinogen Versus Coincidence?, 37 J.
ORAL SURGERY 250, 250-53 (1979).
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hypothesis, we would recommend the discontinuation of mouthwash,
and under the second, we would not. However, in either event, we
can determine that there is a subset of the general population with a
higher incidence of mouth cancer, i.e., people who use mouthwash
with alcohol in it.20 Armed with this information, regardless of the
cause of the cancer, we would want to screen mouthwash users for
cancer more frequently than non-users. We would, as a result,
discover more cases of cancer for the same effort when compared to
screening the whole population. These two examples serve to
highlight the usefulness of demonstrated correlations without
conclusions as to causation.
B. Value for Predicting Outcomes
The practical ramifications of the conclusions of Reversal Rates
for attorneys, litigants, and the judicial system are, indeed, highly
significant, as the results invariably aid in predicting appellate
outcomes.
Prediction of success is of paramount importance in the
system for several reasons. In the course of litigation,
lawyers constantly make strategic decisions and/or advise
their clients on the basis of these predictions. Attorneys
make decisions about future courses of action, such as ...
whether to advise the client to enter into settlement
negotiations, and whether to accept a settlement offer or
proceed to trial. Thus, these professional judgments by
lawyers are influential in shaping the cases and the
mechanisms selected to resolve them. Clients' choices and
outcomes therefore depend on the abilities of their counsel
to make reasonably accurate forecasts concerning case
outcomes . . . 21
Whether a lawyer is able to predict accurately the outcome of a
case has a direct effect on three areas relevant to attorneys: "(a) the
lawyer's professional reputation and financial success; (b) the
20. Studies further undertaking the causal-relationship analysis suggest that the causal
relationship does exist. Deborah M. Winn et al., Mouthwash Use and Oral Conditions in the Risk
of Oral and Pharyngeal Cancer, 51 CANCER RES. 3044, 3047 (1991).
21. Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers' Ability to Predict Case
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 133, 134 (2010).
344
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satisfaction of the client; and (c) the justice environment as a whole.
Litigation is risky, time consuming, and expensive."22
Indeed, the consequences of misjudging outcomes can be costly
for lawyers, their clients, and the justice system.23 Lawyers who
frequently advise clients to pursue litigation without delivering
successful outcomes will diminish their client base.24
Likewise, a client will be most satisfied with a lawyer who
is accurate and realistic when detailing the potential
outcomes of the case. At the end of the day, it is [sic] the
accurate predictions of the lawyer that enable the justice
system to function smoothly without the load of cases that
were not appropriately vetted by the lawyers. Several lines
of research support the proposition that lawyers'
assessments of goals are central in the legal system. Some
research singled out the attorney's estimate of the
probability of success as the most crucial variable in
shaping decisions whether to litigate or settle a case in
controversy.25
Thus, if any of the factors considered in Reversal Rates
correlated positively with reversal (as one did), an attorney
considering whether to appeal the decision of a district judge in the
Eighth Circuit should look for the existence of this (or these)
factor(s) to aid in making more accurate the critical prediction of
success. Given that the political affiliation of the trial judge-and
only this one of the considered factors-was shown in Reversal
Rates to correlate with the likelihood of reversal by the Eighth
Circuit, all else being equal, an attorney practicing in the relevant
jurisdictions should be more inclined to appeal decisions of
Democratic district judges.
Of course, all else is often not equal, as cases always have
unique aspects. However, research demonstrates that when faced
with subjective determinations of the strength of a case, attorneys
22. Id.
22. Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Lawyers-Especially Men-May Be Too Optimistic
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often overestimate the likelihood of success. 6 Indeed, empirical
research further shows that this overconfidence is correlated with
gender (male). 27 And experience was not a moderating factor in the
accuracy of attorneys' predictions.2 8 Equally, neither whether the
attorney handled civil or criminal matters nor the temporal distance
to trial influenced the predictive abilities of the attorneys handling
the cases.29 Thus, using objective data to aid in predicting outcomes
is critical. While data likely will never fully supplant subjective
evaluations, it will, hopefully, inform them positively. Indeed,
research again supports this proposition: "Studies of forecasting in
other professional domains showed that when the ambiguity of the
problem was reduced, forecasters relied on more objective and fewer
subjective factors in making their predictions.""o
C. Basis for Party-Affiliation Effect
The showing of a statistically significant correlation between
party affiliation and reversal rate likely reflects the fact that the
judicial philosophy of the Eighth Circuit-which is largely
Republican-is more in line with the philosophy of Republican
district judges when compared to Democratic district judges. " The
study does not imply that the Eighth Circuit sinisterly screens cases
on appeal for the political affiliation of the trial judge (although such
a cause is theoretically possible). 32 Rather, the study likely provides
support for the conclusion that judicial decision making is more than
a mechanical exercise. It is a product of many factors, including
judges' world view and political philosophies. 33
While some suggest that certain political philosophies should be
used to disqualify decision makers with whom the appointers (the
president and Senate in the federal system) disagree,34 others suggest
26. Id. at 141.
27. Id. at 142-43.
28. Id at 144.
29. Id. at 145.
30. Id. at 149.
31. See Steinbuch, supra note 6, at 64-65.
32. Id.
33. Id
34. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 188 (2007) ("In this way, each and every justice has identified
some set of values and principles that, in his or her view, deserve judicial protection. Values and
346
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just the opposite.3 Regardless of one's position on this debate, the
notion that political and moral philosophies affect how judges see the
law is well discussed. 36 Reversal Rates adds an important dimension
to this debate-further scientific support.
Thus, rather than eschewing empirical descriptions of how
judges and courts do their jobs, Reversal Rates adds to the growing
literature by employing a systematic method to build on the less-
than-rigorous anecdotal approach. This method of analysis-
empirical research-adds a dimension of intellectual precision and
thoughtfulness often absent from solely anecdotal descriptions of
cases and events, which might be called, at times, intellectual
whimsy.
principles of this kind, define a justice's judicial philosophy. . .. When the president nominates a
justice, the Senate must assess the nominee's judicial philosophy and determine whether it is
sound enough to warrant confirmation."); cf Richard J. Peltz, From the Ivory Tower to the Glass
House: Access to De-Identified Public University Admission Records to Study Affirmative Action,
25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 181, 197 n.23 (2009) (discussing how a University of Arkansas at
Little Rock Bowen Law School administrator suggested that individuals with a certain political or
philosophical preference should be excluded from certain decision-making positions).
35. See, e.g., Michael Saul, Supreme Court Nominee Sonia Sotomayor 'Open,' Will Follow
Law on Abortion Issue, Says Friend, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 29, 2009, 5:19 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2009/05/29/2009-05-29_supreme-court.html
("[Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor] will follow what she thinks is the law on that, and
her personal beliefs will not interfere with that analysis because my view of her is that she does
not allow her personal beliefs to interfere with her analysis of legal issues."); see also Robert
Steinbuch, Bonding Justice, 80 Miss. L.J. 377, 385 n.9 (2010) (book review) (citing the above).
36. See generally EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING (2009) (discussing how decision makers' views
play a significant role in judicial decisions and how judges are unconsciously more likely to find
legal authority to support their preferences, while recognizing that facts, law, and accepted norms
of legal reasoning limit the judges' ability to impose their personal views); Theodore A. McKee,
Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709 (2007). But see Michael A. Wolff, Law Matters:
What Do Judges Believe... Really?, YOUR MISSOURI COURTS: THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF
STATE GOVERNMENT (Feb. 27, 2006), http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=1080 ("Court
opinions are not personal beliefs. Supreme Court opinions are directed at one result: resolving a
legal dispute. They do not necessarily reflect any judge's personal views about the subject matter,
nor are they pronouncements of political policy. A review of the Court's opinions would show
that decisions are based on laws enacted by the General Assembly, previous court decisions, court
rules, constitutional provisions or other guiding legal authority. Different judges may differ on
what a legal provision means or what legal principle controls a case. An individual judge may
write a separate opinion dissenting or concurring with the opinion of the Court; there you may
find an expression of one judge's individual views about what a legal provision means or what
legal principle should control.... Judges, as other citizens, have personal beliefs. When citizens
come to courts to serve as jurors, we instruct them to set aside their persons beliefs and decide
cases based on the law and the facts. The same is true for judges, who take an oath to do just
that.").
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D. Outlier Judges
Reversal Rates also discussed how the Eighth Circuit only
reversed eight of its over sixty district judges for abusing their
discretion more than once in the 2008 calendar year (adjusting out
sentencing-guideline cases due to the transitional nature of this area
of law)." These judges are:
* Judge Gary A. Fenner, Western District of Missouri
* Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Western District of Missouri
* Judge Jean C. Hamilton, Eastern District of Missouri
* Judge Charles B. Kornmann, District of South Dakota
* Judge Nanette K. Laughrey, Western District of Missouri
* Judge James M. Rosenbaum, District of Minnesota
* Judge Karen E. Schreier, District of South Dakota
* Judge William R. Wilson, Jr., Eastern District of Arkansas
Reversal Rates did not discuss certain other conclusions that the
collected data also showed. I now present them here.
First, the aforementioned adjustment for sentencing-guideline
cases only removed one judge from the total number reversed more
than once in 2008 for an abuse of discretion. 3 Thus, only nine out of
the sixty-plus district judges in the Eighth Circuit were reversed for
an abuse of discretion more than once in the calendar year 2008.
Similarly, the data further revealed that the reversals for an abuse of
discretion by these nine judges represented a startling amount-
totaling over half of all of the reversals under the abuse-of-discretion
standard (the most deferential of all of the standards of review) by
the Eighth Circuit in 2008.40
The remaining fewer-than-half of the abuse-of-discretion cases
were scattered among twenty-one judges. Thus, nine district judges
were responsible for twenty-five abuse-of-discretion reversals, and
the remaining twenty-one reversals under this standard were
individually distributed among twenty-one judges.
Finally, if one analyzes only judges whom the Eighth Circuit
reversed three or more times under the abuse-of-discretion standard,
37. See Steinbuch, supra note 6, at 64, 73-78 tbl.B.
38. Id. at 64.




the number drops to four-with the maximum number of reversals
for any one judge rising to five for Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr.4 1
III. NOTES OF CAUTION
A. Where to Start
My study required that I pick a federal appellate court, because
analyzing all twelve general circuit courts and the specialized
Federal Circuit would have been too unwieldy and costly for a study
of this type. 42 Since I work for a state school in the Eighth Circuit, it
seemed appropriate (all else being equal) for my school and state to
first fund research of its federal appellate court before looking at
other circuits.43
There is, however, also a methodological reason for this choice:
the Eighth Circuit is overwhelmingly Republican. As such, the three-
member appellate panels were for the most part either strongly
Republican or completely Republican. As a consequence, there is no
significant concern that the observed party effect is panel-party-
composition specific. This inevitably made the study's results more
robust.
That notwithstanding, the study of any circuit is relevant in its
own right, and I encourage others and hope myself to analyze the
other U.S. appellate courts as well.
B. Avoiding Misdirection
It is important during such a project to clearly define its purpose,
because suggestions will abound. I received many good and some
not-so-good recommendations throughout my investigation. I would
like to discuss one of the flawed ideas as a note of caution for the
future researcher because of the relative unfamiliarity with empirical
41. Id. This last figure is interesting. It would not surprise me that appellate courts are more
likely to reverse a trial judge under this standard when the appellate court has already done so in
the past. This would be an interesting area for future study.
42. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 1, at 139-43, 149-53 (discussing the need for
"sampling" and sample size).
43. Three Eighth Circuit judges maintain their chambers in Arkansas: Morris Arnold,
Lavenski Smith, and Bobby Shepherd. All three are Republican appointees. Bobby Shepherd
filled the vacancy made available when Judge Arnold took senior status. History of the Federal
Judiciary: U.S. Court ofAppeals for the Eighth Circuit, Shepherd, Bobby E., FED. JUDICIAL CTR.
http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetlnfo?jid=3127&cid=15&ctype=ac&instate-08 (last visited Nov.
18, 2010).
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research that remains in legal academia." The proposal was not
unique, but it does serve as a worthy illustration of some of the
dangers of accepting less-than-fully informed suggestions.
The proffered idea was to consider whether the three judges
appointed by Democrats sitting on the Eighth Circuit had higher
dissenting rates. This recommendation, however, was inconsistent
with the purpose of the study. Dissenting rates of either Democrats or
Republicans on the appellate level do not advance an inquiry into the
predictive value of aspects of the trial court on the rate of reversal,
because dissents at the appellate level, by definition, do not affect the
outcome of the appeal. In other words, given that the point of the
study was to isolate the factor(s) that statistically impact reversals, a
"dissenter" variable would be completely irrelevant. This is perhaps
obvious given my presentation here, but this illustrates misdirected
suggestions, among others, that on first blush may appear intriguing.
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit has, as discussed, fourteen
Republicans and three Democrats. As such, even if there were a
dependent variable to affect, any attempt to conduct a statistical
analysis of Democratic-only dissents (which numerically would be
very low) would nonetheless produce a standard deviation well
beyond the acceptable range for social scientists.45
Most importantly, however, it is ultimately unclear what end the
proposed analysis would serve. Recall that the purpose of the study
was to evaluate the factors affecting outcomes in the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, and the conclusion was that the
largely Republican Eighth Circuit reverses Democratic district
judges' decisions significantly more often than those of Republican
district judges. The perhaps obvious notion that the three Democratic
judges on the Eighth Circuit may not agree as much with their
Republican counterparts as the latter do with each other not only
does not alter what has been demonstrated by the study, it does not
further its goal.46 Ultimately, that is the critical filter that must be
applied to all suggestions.
44. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 1, at 1, 3-4.
45. Id. at 233-34, 239 (discussing the generally accepted p-value of 5 percent for statistical
significance).
46. A more interesting topic with some facial similarity to the Democratic-dissent proposal,
which has been analyzed, is the willingness of a judge to disagree with co-partisans regardless of
party. See Stephen Choi et al., Judging Women (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper




Legal academicians have too often eschewed objective
quantitative research in favor of finger-in-the-air analysis. Several
reasons exist for why empirical studies appear to be anathema to
many legal scholars, but, unfortunately, one reason is a lack of
competence in this arena. Rigor and objectivity should be favored
and encouraged over speculation and stories. In this Article I have
expanded on my previous conclusions, discussing the factors that
correlate with reversal in the Eighth Circuit, as well as the actions of
outlier judges in this jurisdiction. Through such research, I believe
that those interested in the law will be able to rely on more objective,
and fewer subjective, factors in making predictions, thereby
benefitting clients, attorneys, courts, and the justice system.
the appellate court's internal workings, and not, as was the case in Reversal Rates, an
investigation of the relationship between the appellate court and the courts that it reviews.
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